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http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2014/1/163RESEARCH Open AccessAn energy-efficient random verification protocol
for the detection of node clone attacks in
wireless sensor networks
Yuping Zhou1*, Zhenjie Huang1, Juan Wang1, Rufeng Huang1 and Dongmei Yu2Abstract
It is easy for adversaries to mount node replication attacks due to the unattended nature of wireless sensor
networks. In several replica node detection schemes, witness nodes fail to work before replicas are detected due to
the lack of effective random verification. This paper presents a novel distributed detection protocol to counteract
node replication attacks. Our scheme distributes node location information to multiple randomly selected cells and
then linear-multicasts the information for verification from the localized cells. Simulation results show that the
proposed protocol improves detection efficiency compared with various existing protocols and prolongs the
lifetime of the overall network.
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Wireless sensor networks are known as one of the three
high-tech industries in the new century due to their great
promise and potential with their various applications,
such as in military affairs, industrial production, and
environmental monitoring. Now, more and more security
requirements continue to arise due to the wide application
and the popularization of wireless sensor networks. The
ease of deploying sensor networks improves their appeal.
One sensor node can be easily inserted into an arbitrary
location in a wireless sensor network without triggering
any intervention from the administrator and interaction
with the base station. In fact, the intrusion is only realized
by triggering a simple neighbor discovery protocol. On the
other hand, sensor nodes deployed in an unattended en-
vironment lack prior knowledge and hardware shielding,
which is advantageous for an adversary who wants to
capture and comprise them. Due to the simple structure
of the sensor node, once the attacker captures one or
more of the sensor nodes in the network, the running
program can be cracked through a reverse analysis tech-
nique. Furthermore, the private information of the nodes,* Correspondence: yp_zhou@mnnu.edu.cn
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in any medium, provided the original work is psuch as the node ID and key, is extracted to be used to es-
tablish a secure channel with other nodes. If the adversary
replicates the sensor node by utilizing its credentials and
injecting them into strategic locations, then the de-
structiveness would spread throughout the network.
This attack is called node replication attack. Node repli-
cation attacks leave wireless sensor networks vulnerable to
various insidious attacks, e.g., the adversary can pour false
data into the network to prevent the success of the data
aggregation protocol or the node replication attack can
revoke legitimate nodes and disconnect the network by
triggering a correct execution of the node revocation
protocols [1].
In an effort to detect node replication attacks, re-
searchers first proposed a method called centralized
detection. While located in the wireless sensor networks,
the node produces its location claim and forwards it to
several neighbors; then, one or more neighbors transfer
this claim to a trusted third party, e.g., a base station,
which is responsible for detecting conflicting location
claims. The adversary can then attack the trusted third
party to prevent the detection of the clone nodes,
which creates a single-point failure [2]. As a result, the
centralized monitor scheme fails. Another problem is
that an undue data communication burden is placed
on the nodes surrounding the trusted third party,Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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an effective and efficient detection mechanism is highly
desirable. Thus, the distributed approach is proposed. In
2005 Parno et al. [3] presented two distributed detection
systems designed to address node replication attacks. Both
algorithms randomly select detecting witness nodes from
the entire wireless sensor networks. One protocol, named
the randomized multicast (RM) algorithm, multicasts the





as witness nodes. Another protocol is the line-selected
multicast (LSM), which explores the routing topology of
the network to select witness nodes for the location of a
node and utilizes geometric probability to detect repli-
cated nodes. The complication is that there exists either a
low replica detection success rate or a high communication
cost; therefore, a balance between efficiency and security
cannot be achieved. Thus, discovering an effective method
for selecting the witness nodes is a serious dilemma.
In this paper, a preliminary distributed protocol is pre-
sented for its use in detecting node replication attacks,
which is called the global deterministic linear propaga-
tion verification protocol (GDL). In a GDL scheme, the
location information of the node is propagated and
stored along the horizontal and the vertical directions.
The collision of conflicting location claims, which refers
to the nodes with the same location information or with
the same ID but in different locations, appears in the
intersection of both the horizontal and vertical lines.
The GDL scheme is not resilient to a smart node replica-
tion attack due to its deterministic verification process. In
order to increase its robustness against a smart attack, we
also describe an extension of the GDL scheme, called the
randomized parallel multiple cells linear propagation
(RMC) verification protocol. The basis of the RMC
scheme is the combination of the localized multicast
and the linear multicast. In the RMC scheme, witness
nodes are randomly selected from several geographically
limited regions in the wireless sensor networks, which is
named cell. Within a line-selected cell, witness nodes
along certain x-axes and y-axes detect the clone nodes.
The Birthday Paradox is applied to map the location




cells. A collision will ap-
pear with high probability if clone nodes are inserted
into the network. In other words, the location claims of
the clone nodes with the same ID but in different loca-





cells. One major advantage of the RMC
protocol is that random verification is used to provide a
much higher level of compromise-resilience; another
advantage is the ability to increase both the resilience
and the security of the protocol. Compared with the
protocols of Parno et al., both are built on the principle
of monitoring randomization versus deterministic mon-
itoring; however, the detection rate is much higher andthe communication overhead is much lower with our
scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, some of the previous research related to the
protocols used to detect clone attacks is summarized
and their performances are analyzed. In Section 3, a
preliminary approach is proposed, which utilizes global
deterministic verification. In Section 4, the preliminary
approach is extended and the novel distributed detection
protocol, which is based on localized linear multicast ran-
dom verification, is presented. Analysis of the security and
efficiency of the novel protocol and the simulation results
are shown in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Finally, the
conclusion is drawn in Section 7.
2 Related works
In terms of the category of detective techniques used for
node replication attacks, there are two types of known
detecting methods, including centralized techniques [4-7]
and distributed techniques [3,8-13]. In centralized tech-
niques, the base station is considered to be the center,
which is responsible for information-collecting and
decision-making. During the process, every node in the
network sends its location claim to the base station
through its neighboring nodes. Upon receiving all of
the location claims, the base station checks the node
IDs and their locations. If there are nodes with the
same ID, but in different locations, then the base sta-
tion raises a clone node alarm [1]. It is easy for this
method to fall into a single-point fault. Brooks et al.
[14] proposed an algorithm that would detect the node
replication attacks by utilizing a statistical model based
on the occurrence number of keys used to authenticate
the nodes in wireless sensor networks, but the method
can only be applied successfully with certain random
key pre-distribution schemes. Choi et al. [4] proposed
a SET protocol in which the whole network is divided
into exclusive subsets. Each of the subsets has a subset
leader and members are one hop away from the subset
leader. Multiple roots are randomly determined to
construct multiple subtrees. Each subset leader collects
information from its members and forwards it to the
root of the subtree. The intersection operation is per-
formed on each root of the subtree to detect clone
nodes. Yu et al. [5] proposed a centralized technique,
called compressed sensing-based clone identification,
for wireless sensor networks. Znaidi et al. [8] proposed
a cluster head selection-based hierarchical distributed
algorithm that detects clone nodes using a Bloom filter
mechanism that includes the network reactions. Conti
et al. [6] proposed another centralized protocol, called
the randomized, efficient, and distributed (RED) proto-
col. In this protocol, the base station multicasts a ran-
dom number to the global hash function in order to
Zhou et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 2014, 2014:163 Page 3 of 12
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2014/1/163output the location of witness nodes in each round of
detection.
The general concept and the main idea of the centralized
solution were described for the first time in the paper
by Parno et al. [3]. According to this paper, there are
several drawbacks inherent to a centralized system.
First, the trusted third party (e.g., base station) plays an
important role in the clone node detection. The base
station is more likely to be compromised and to fall
into a single-point failure. Second, the nodes surrounding
the base station bear large amounts of the routing load.
Adversaries may block the tunnel of the communication,
and thus circumvent detection. Meanwhile, the power
of those nodes is used up, so the lifespan of the network
is shortened. Finally, for many networks, there is no
powerful base station due to its high cost, so it is neces-
sary to apply a distribution solution.
Parno et al. [3] first proposed two distributed methods
for detecting clone nodes: the randomized multicast and
the line-selected multicast. In these two methods, a
random verification mechanism with higher security is
adopted. Unfortunately, the random multicast algo-
rithm also requires a higher communication cost and
the line-selected multicast has a low node replication
attack detection success rate. Zhu et al. [15] presented
a distributed approach, called the single deterministic
cell (SDC). In their method, wireless sensor networks
are divided into several cells, and the location claim of
each node is mapped to a cell and broadcasted within
the cell. Nodes in the cell store location claims with
certain probabilities and detect the conflicts. Zhu et al.
revised the method and proposed the parallel multiple
probabilistic cells (P-MPC) method. The difference be-
tween the SDC and the P-MPC is that the latter method
maps location claims to one or more cells with different
probabilities. Compared with the method of Parno et al.
[3], localized multicast is more efficient in terms of its
communication and memory costs; but, the level of
compromise-resilience is low because the method is a
variant of deterministic verification. Different from
random verification, the deterministic verification means
that witness nodes can be predicted during the detection
cycle. Adversaries escape detection by compromising or
controlling witness nodes to protect their clone nodes,
which is called a smart attack. Random verification is ne-
cessary for high resilience to smart attacks.
Zhang et al. [9] proposed four memory efficient multi-
cast protocols to detect replicated nodes, namely, memory
efficient multicast with Bloom filters (B-MEM), memory
efficient multicast with Bloom filters and cell forward-
ing (BC-MEM), memory efficient multicast with cross-
forwarding (C-MEM), and memory efficient multicast
with cross and cell forwarding (CC-MEM). The B-MEM
is an extension of the LSM, which generates morememory cost per node and lower detection rates. The
CC-MEM and C-MEM work poorly. In 2010, Zeng
et al. [10] proposed two detection protocols, namely,
the Random Walk (RAWL) and the Table-Assisted
Random Walk (TRAWL) to detect node replication at-
tacks. Both of these protocols are an extension of the
LSM and thus possess the same drawbacks. Although
they can achieve much higher detection probabilities
than the LSM, both the RAWL and TRAWL require
more than twice the communication overhead of the
LSM. It is important that random verification schemes
improve the efficiency of the algorithm, including the
communication and memory overhead required.
Node replica detection techniques for mobile WSNs
have been developed in recent years [16-24]. Ho et al.
[16,17] proposed a mobile replica detection scheme based
on the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT). Deng and
Xiong [18] presented a new protocol to detect the replicas
in mobile WSNs using the theory of polynomials based on
the pair-wise key pre-distribution and Bloom filters. Lou
et al. [22] proposed a node clone attack detection proto-
col, namely, the single hop detection (SHP) for mobile
wireless sensor networks. Zhu et al. [23] proposed two
replica detection algorithms for mobile sensor networks.
The first algorithm is a token-based authentication
scheme; the second algorithm is a statistics-based detec-
tion scheme for detecting replicas that cooperates with
one another.
3 The protocol framework
3.1 Protocol requirements
Wireless sensor networks are vulnerable to a wide variety
of physical attacks. One of those attacks is known as the
node replication attack, in which one or more nodes are
added into the network with a legitimate ID stolen from a
normal node. Detecting such an attempt by centralized
monitoring is not preferred due to several inherent
drawbacks. Utilizing distributed monitoring can avoid
single-point failures effectively. In order to prevent the
adversary from predicting the witness nodes and caus-
ing them to fail in advance, it is necessary for the
protocol to utilize a random and distributed technique
when selecting nodes to act as witnesses.
The revocation mechanism is also needed. As soon as
the clone node is discovered, the subverted node and its
clone nodes should be illegitimized. Normal nodes in
the network stop communicate with the illegal nodes.
Sensor nodes distributed in the network suffer from
several inherent deficiencies, such as limited energy
and a small amount of memory, which is in the order
of a few kilobytes. The protocol must decrease the
amount of communication and computation required
to obtain the low communication and memory costs
needed for satisfactory results. At the same time, we
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success rate in detecting node replication attacks.
3.2 The system and network model
Wireless sensor networks are composed of hundreds or
thousands of small low-cost sensor nodes. These sensor
nodes are uniformly spread across a wide area and function
in an unsupervised fashion. During the life cycle of the
wireless sensor network, new nodes are added into the
network and other nodes die due to power loss or acci-
dental damage and disappear. The base station in the
wireless sensor network is assumed to be safe and trusted.
In our protocol, each node knows its own location via
GPS and the sensor network is considered a geographic
grid, in which each unit is called a cell.
In our scheme, an identity-based public key system is
applied, in which the private key is generated by signing
its public key with a master secret held only by the
trusted authority (TA). So, it is impossible for an adver-
sary to create a new identity for intruding nodes [25]. In
fact, some researchers have explored all kinds of tech-
niques to prevent adversaries from deploying nodes with
arbitrary IDs in the network. For example, Chan et al.
[26] presented a key pre-distribution scheme, in which
the ID of each node could correspond to the set of secret
keys shared with its neighbors. In this case, the adversary
cannot create a new ID without the appropriate keys. The
only way for the attacker to compromise a legitimate node
is to get a new ID.
The energy consumption of the sensor node includes
three main parts: data sensing, data processing, and data
transmission and reception, amongst which the energy
consumed by communication is the most critical. We
adopt the first-order radio model in the transmission
and receiving modes. To transmit a l-bit message a dis-
tance d using the radio model, the radio expends
Esend ¼ lEelec þ lεfsd
2 d≺d0
lEelec þ lεmpd2 d≻d0

ð1Þ
where Eelec represents the radio dissipates to run the
transmitter or receiver circuitry; εfs represents the power
amplification loss in the free space model, and εmp rep-
resents the power amplification loss in the multipath
fading channel model. As shown in Equation 1, if the
transmission distance is less than the threshold value d0,
then the power amplification loss in the free space
model is used. If the transmission distance is greater
than or equal to the threshold value d0, then the power
amplification loss in the multipath fading channel model is
adopted. To receive this l-bit message, the radio expends
Ereceive ¼ lEelec ð2Þ3.3 Adversary model
In the system, a simple and powerful attacker can capture
a limited number of legitimate nodes and subvert these
nodes to get their private information, such as a pair of
keys, credentials, and cryptograph information. With this
secret information, a clone node can communicate with
any of the nodes in the network. It is easy to insert a clone
node into the network because the original design for the
sensor networks was to facilitate ad hoc deployment.
Once replicas are added into the networks, all kinds of
attacks arise, including eavesdropping and modifying or
replaying a message. We assume that there are only a
small percentage of subverted sensor nodes because if
most of the legitimate sensor nodes are compromised,
then any protocol to detect the replicas will no longer
be in force within the network. We also suppose that at
least one neighbor of the replica is legitimate.
It is assumed that the adversary can remember the
nodes that have been subverted and do not repeat their
attempts to capture the same nodes. In order to avoid
triggering an automated protocol to sweep the network
and remove compromised nodes, we assume that the
adversary operates in a stealthy manner.
4 The random multicell linear multicast approach
for detecting node replication attacks
The GDL and its variant, the RMC, have been designed.
4.1 Global deterministic linear propagation verification
In the GDL scheme, the format of a location claim is
expressed as
IDL; lL; SIGSKL H IDLjjlLð Þð Þgf
where IDL is the identity of node L, and lL is the location
information of node L, which can be described by either
the two-dimensional coordinate (xL, yL) or three-
dimensional coordinate (xL, yL, zL); ‖ denotes the concat-
enation operation, and SIGSKL(H(IDL||lL)) denotes the
encrypting hash code of the data, which holds a concaten-
ation of the identity and the location information of node
L using its private key in order to verify its identity.
When node L transmits its location claim along the
horizontal xL-axis and the vertical yL-axis lines, the
neighbors within a one-hop distance on the both axes
first verify the plausibility of lL, according to the loca-
tion and the transmission range of the sensor, and then
verify the validity of the signature in the location claim
by applying an identity-based signature scheme. Only a
signature generated using the private key correspond-
ing to the claimed identity can be approved in the
verification process, which means that the adversary
cannot achieve a legitimate signature without the right
private key.
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forward the information to the neighbors within a one-
hop distance on both the lines of the horizontal xL-axis
and the vertical yL-axis as soon as verification is obtained.
During this propagation procedure, every node on both
the lines of the horizontal xL-axis and the vertical yL-axis
becomes a witness node. Whenever any witness node
receives a location claim, it judges whether there is
another node with the same ID claiming a different
location by comparing it with previously stored claims.
If conflicting location claims appear, then the witness
node would forward both location claims to the base
station. The base station would then broadcast a message
within the network to revoke the replicas and the sub-
verted node. The propagation will not stop until a conflict
is detected or the location claim packet reaches the border
of the network.
If witness nodes are selected from the sensor nodes
where the two lines intersect, then the probability of
detecting replicas is relatively low. As shown in Figure 1,
when the location claim of node L is forwarded from
point a to point b and the location claim of replica L′ is
forwarded from point c to point d, there is no sensor
node deployed at the point where line ab intersects line
cd to act as a witness node, so the detection of the replicas
fails. In order to gain a high success rate, the scope of the
area in which witnesses are selected should be extended.
Surface-intersecting verification takes the place of line-
intersecting verification, which can be interpreted as a
verification surface that is composed of a circle area of
witness nodes on the horizontal or vertical axes and its
neighbors within a one-hop distance. Every node in the
surface acts as a witness node. When a verification surface
on the horizontal axis intersects with another verification
surface on the vertical axis, there must be at least oneFigure 1 The invalidity of line intersection.intersecting point on the intersection of the two surfaces,
which can detect the replica. This is not the case with
line-intersecting verification. The success rate for detect-
ing node replication attacks reaches 100%, which is a great
improvement.
For example, in Figure 2, a node g with coordinate
(xg,yg) is supposed to be a replica of node a with coordin-
ate (xα,yα). Node a propagates its location claim along
both the xα-axis and the yα-axis. At the same time, node
g propagates its location claim along the xg-axis and the
yg-axis. During the process of forwarding the packet, the
witness nodes store received information and broadcast
them to their one-hop distance neighbors, which also
store information in order to detect replicas. As a result,
the node m, which is selected from the intersection
points where the verification surface centered on the
xα-axis meets the verification surface centered on the
yg-axis (or on yα-axis and xg-axis), discovers the replica.
A major advantage of the GDL is that the protocol ensures
a 100% success rate for the detection of node replication
attacks. The communication cost and the memory cost
are tightly related to the number of sensor nodes in the
network. The communication cost is O
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
pð Þ and the




4.2 Randomized parallel multiple cells linear propagation
A potential risk comes from a smart attack against the
GDL protocol. An adversary can predict the location of
witness nodes and then capture and compromise them
before the protocol starts to work by launching a smart
attack. In GDL, when a clone node is deployed in the
network, the adversary can block the forwarding of the
replica's location claim on the horizontal or vertical axis.
The propagation direction of the replica's location claim is
deterministic because the deploying location is known.
The attacker can compromise the one-hop neighbors of
the clone node on the horizontal or vertical axis in order
to prevent the propagation of the replica's location claim.
The attacker can also subvert any node on the horizontal
or vertical axis to prevent replicas from being detected.
In our RMC scheme, the wireless sensor networks are
assumed to be composed of n sensor nodes and have a
relative static detection cycle. The sensor node can be
removed or added within the detection interval. Every
node determines its geographic location information by
using GPS or the positioning algorithm and acquires one
two-dimensional coordinate (x,y), which creates a unique
identity. The protocol includes three steps:
(1) Establishment stage for the geographic grid (cell)
In this stage, the whole network is divided into several
exclusive clusters that are named cells. The LEACH
routing algorithm [27] is adopted to determine the
cluster headers in the first detection cycle. After the
Figure 2 Protocol diagram. Empty circles denote the common sensor nodes, filled circles denote sensor nodes deployed in the forwarding
path of the location information, letter a denotes one sensor node, letter g denotes the replica of node a, letter t and letter m denote sensor
nodes deployed in the intersection points of the forwarding path.
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sensor nodes based on the principle of ‘more residual
energy, more priority’ in the network. Nodes compete
to be the cluster header according to the current
energy/average energy ratio within a cluster, and
multihop communication is used among the cluster
header nodes. In fact, the cluster header node
broadcasts its information as soon as it is elected as
the cluster header. Normal nodes that apply to take
part in a certain cluster are selected based on the
principle of minimum communication cost (the
communication costs are different between the node
and different cluster headers). At the same time, the
node records the information of the other cluster
headers. The cluster header adds the node into its
own routing table and the node identifies the cluster
by using a geographic grid algorithm. As a result, a
two-layer structure would be built into the net-
work. Suppose the whole sensor network is divided
into m = u × v cells, which indicates that there are
a total of u rows and v columns in the network. A
cell at the uth row and the vth column is uniquely
identified as w (where w = (u ' − 1) × v + v ', u ' ∈ {1,
2,…, u}, v ' ∈ {1, 2,…, v}).
(2) Mapping stage of verification cells
At the beginning of the detection protocol, the
location claim format of every node is expressed as
fIDL; lL; SIGSKL H IDLjjlLð Þð Þg
where IDL is the identity of node L, and lL is the
location information of node L, which can bedescribed as either the two-dimensional coordinate
(xL,yL) or the three-dimensional coordinate (xL, yL,
zL); ‖ denotes the concatenation operation, and
SIGSKL(H(IDL||lL)) denotes the encrypting hash code
of the data, which holds a concatenation of the
identity and the location information of node L using
the key of node L in order to verifying the identity of
node L. When a node replication attack happens,
node L randomly selects q cells in the wireless sensor
networks and maps its own location information to
the cells C = {C1,C2,…,Cq}. According to the Birthday
Paradox Theorem, in the sensor networks composed





cells for verification, creating a very high
probability of at least one collision appearing. Make
q be the order of O
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
m
pð Þ. At first, nodes receive a
location claim within their respective cells; they
authenticate its identity by unlocking the signature
with the corresponding key and judge the rationality
of the information according to its rough transmis-
sion radius. The location claim packets that cannot
pass verification should be discarded. The location
claim packets that pass verification will then begin
the linear-selected nodes verification process within
the cells.
(3) The linear-selected multicast verification stage
inside the cell
Node L maps its own location claim to a certain cell.
Suppose node a (xα, yα) is the first one that receives
the location claim of node L. Node a is the first to
authenticate the identity of the packet; if the
authentication fails, then the packet is discarded. If
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stores the location claim of node L to act as a
witness node; in addition, node a forwards the
location claim to its neighbors within a one-hop
distance, which then act as auxiliary witness nodes
in the same way. In other words, the verification
surface is centered in the witness node on or nearest
to the xα-axis or the yα-axis and includes the neigh-
bor nodes within a one-hop distance. Next, all of the
nodes in the verification surface compare the location
claim of node L with other stored location claims.
If nodes appear that claim the same ID but have
different geographic location, then the occurrence
of a node replication attack would be determined;
the witness node reports the ID of the clone nodes
directly to the base station and the base station
broadcasts a bulletin of the invalid ID within the
network. Otherwise, node a propagates the location
claim along both the horizontal xα-axis and the verti-
cal yα-axis using a geographic routing protocol [28]
and the TTL is decreased by 1. The neighbors nearest
to the xα-axis or the yα-axis are selected to forward
the packet until replicas are detected or the packet is
discarded when the TTL equals to zero.
During the verification process, all the witness nodes
are either on the same xα-axis or the same yα-axis
within the cell. Thus, when the two conflicting
location claim packets propagate along both the
horizontal xα-axis and the vertical yα-axis in the same
cell respectively, they must meet in the intersection
of the verification surfaces and be detected with 100%
probability. An example is shown in Figure 2. To
reduce the memory cost, the complete information of
the location claim is only stored in the witness nodes,
not in the auxiliary witness nodes, because the
auxiliary witness nodes no longer need to forward the
location claim. A compressed location claim, including
IDL and lL but not SIGSKL(H(IDL||lL)), will be stored
in the auxiliary witness nodes.5 Analysis of the RMC scheme
5.1 Security analysis
Suppose clone node L′ is deployed in l locations includ-
ing L = {l1,l2,…,ll}. According to the Birthday Paradox





cells for verification within the wireless sensor net-
work composed of m cells, there is a very high probability
of collision. In this case, collision refers to when location
claims with the same identity but in different locations are
mapped to the same cell.
Every node maps its own location claim to q verifica-
tion cells, which are selected randomly. According to theBirthday Paradox Theorem, the probability that q cells
selected to map the location claim containing the pos-
ition l1 do not receive the q copies of the location claim
containing the same identity in position l2 is Pnc1:
Pnc1 ¼ 1− qm
 q
ð3Þ
In the same way, the probability that q cells selected to
map the location claim containing position l3 do not
receive the 2q copies of the location claim containing
the same identity respectively in position l2 and position
l1 is Pnc2:
Pnc2 ¼ 1− 2qm
 q
ð4Þ
So, the probability that location claims with the same
identity but in different locations are not mapped to the









According to the standard approximation that (1 + x) ≤ ex
make x ¼ − iqm and then substitute the standard approxi-

































m  l l−1ð Þ2 ð8Þ
The probability of collision, in which the location
claims with the same ID but in different positions are
mapped to the same cell is pc:
pc ¼ 1−pnc ð9Þ
Substitute Equation 8 into Equation 9 to obtain
pc ≥ 1−e
−q2
m  l l−1ð Þ2 ð10Þ
Let q ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃmp . When l =1, there is only one clone node
for node L, and the collision probability is 63%. When
l =2, there are two clone nodes for node L, and the colli-
sion probability is over 96%, and so on. The greater the
value of l, the greater the probability of collision is.
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The metrics used to evaluate the energy consumption
and efficiency of the RMC scheme are the following:
1. Communication cost: the average number of packets
sent and received while running the replica
detection algorithm in a wireless sensor network
composed of n nodes, which is denoted as Ccom
2. Memory cost: the average number of copies of the
location claims stored on a sensor, which is denoted
as Cmem
3. Percentage of the energy-exhausted nodes: the
proportion of energy-exhausted nodes to all nodes
In the RMC scheme, the communication cost Ccom is
computed as follows:
Ccom ¼ Cf þ Cs ð11Þ
where Cf is the communication cost of mapping the lo-
cation claim to the cell, and Cs is the communication
cost of propagating the location claim along both the
horizontal axis and the vertical axis for detection. Because
nodes in the network are randomly deployed on the square
unit and the average distance between any two randomly














and the communication cost Cs is in the order of O
q  2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃn m= Þp , where ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃn m=p is the average length of the




pð Þ , so according to Equation 11, the com-
munication cost is Ccom ¼ O
ﬃﬃ
n





In terms of the memory cost Cmem, every location
claim is stored and propagated along both the horizontal
axis and the vertical axis, and during the process of veri-
fication, the node on the axis is taken as the center and
works together with its one-hop distance neighbors to
form a verification surface. In order to keep the collision
probability over 63%, q is made to be in the order of Oﬃﬃﬃﬃ
m
pð Þ , so the average memory cost for a node is in the
order of O q  ﬃﬃﬃnmp  d þ ﬃﬃﬃnmp  2  , that is, O ﬃﬃﬃnpð Þ ,






is the average length of the side of a
cell. In terms of security, multiple cells are selected ran-
domly in every detection cycle. In the cells, the sensor
node receiving the newest information first forwards the
location claim along both horizontal and vertical direc-
tions. The randomness reflected in the different stages
of the RMC scheme is resistant to the smart attack of
node replication. At the same time, the randomness
can assist in avoiding a single-point failure and the
phenomenon that energy consumption at the local area is
so large that the nodes perish. The RMC scheme prolongsthe lifespan of the network, while still achieving a high
rate of detecting node replication attacks.
According to several random verification protocols, as
is shown in Table 1, the average communication overhead
and memory overhead per node of the RMC protocol is
summarized, together with the LSM and RM protocols
proposed by Parno et al. and the P-MPC protocol pro-
posed by Zhu et al., where n is the number of sensor
nodes in the network, d is the average number of neigh-
bors of every node, g denotes the number of destinations
to which a neighbor forwards the location claim, pf is the
probability that any neighbor of a node decides to forward
the location claim from the node, w is the number of wit-
ness nodes, and m is the number of cells.
The general node-aging problem is examined by con-
sidering the percentage of the energy-exhausted nodes.
In order to enhance the vitality of the network, methods
for reducing the energy consumption should be considered
in the design of a protocol for the detection of node rep-
lication attacks. The energy consumption of the com-
munication module in the sensor node is the largest
portion of the total energy consumption. The communi-
cation module is responsible for receiving and sending
information packets, so a lower communication overhead
makes the energy consumption lower. On the other hand,
different verification mechanisms affect energy consump-
tion. Random verification consumes the energy of the net-
work evenly, which prolongs the lifespan of the network,
whereas deterministic verification distributes the energy
consumption unevenly. The undue data communica-
tion flaw may shorten the network's life expectancy.
6 Evaluation
A simulation experiment is performed to verify the
accuracy of our scheme through OMNeT++, which is an
extensible, modular, component-based C++ simulation
library and framework, primarily used for building large-
scale network simulators. In our simulation, n nodes are
deployed uniformly at random within a 500 m × 500 m
monitoring area. The communication between the differ-
ent nodes follows the standard unit-disc bidirectional
communication model. The number of sensor nodes var-
ies from 1,000 to 10,000 at an increasing speed of 1,000.
The communication range is adjusted to keep approxi-
mately 40 neighbors per node on average. Several physical
parameters of the energy consumption model are set:
the initial energy of each node E =0.5 J, the power amp-
lification loss in the free space model εfs =10 pJ/bit/m
2,
the power amplification loss in the multipath fading
channel model εmp =0.0013 pJ/bit/m
4, the threshold
distance d0 = 88 m; the energy the radio dissipates to run
the transmitter or receiver circuitry Eelec =50 nJ/bit.
Geographic routing protocol of greedy forwarding
mechanism [27] is adopted to forward the information
Table 1 Comparisons of average communication overhead and memory overhead
Communication overhead Memory overhead




Line-selected multicast (LSM) O g pf  d 
ﬃﬃﬃ
n















P-MPC O r  ﬃﬃﬃnpð Þ þ O sð Þ o(w)
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http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2014/1/163packets. We assume that there is only one compromised
node and one clone node in our experiment, which are
deployed randomly in the network monitoring area. The
simulation experiment is run 100 times for each parameter
and the average value is the final result reported.
We assume the number of cells in the network is m.
Some assumptions in the formulation of the simulation
that may affect the results are important. In order to re-
flect the fairness of the evaluation, the same assumptions
will be made in this paper as are shown in the formulation
used by Zhu et al. [15]. The specific configuration parame-
ters are as follows:






















where l denotes the side length of the wireless sensor
network, R is the communication range of a node, roundFigure 3 Collision probability of cell mapping.( ) is a function that rounds the input to the nearest in-
teger; d is the average number of a node's neighbors;
and n is the number of sensor nodes in the network.
When there are some areas not covered in the broadcast
range, the unicast mode is adopted.
Suppose lcell is the side length of a cell when the location
claim packet is propagated along the horizontal or vertical
direction, the maximum forwarding distance does not ex-
ceed lcell hop. The TTL contained in the packet is set as





, and the collision probability of
conflicting location claims in the same cell is 100%.
Every node randomly selects and maps its own loca-




pð Þ, the probability of collision when conflicting loca-
tion claims are mapped to the same cell exceeds 63%.
According to the computation of Equation 10, as is
shown in Figure 3, when q ¼ 3 ﬃﬃﬃﬃmp holds, the probability
of collision when conflicting location claims are mapped
to the same cell is over 99%. When q ¼ 4 ﬃﬃﬃﬃmp holds, then
the probability of collision when conflicting location
claims are mapped to the same cell is 100%. Accordingly,
the communication overhead and the storage overhead
also increase. Simulation results show that when the size
of cell s decreases to 1, then the number of mapping cells
q increases to n; that is, q = n, s =1, then the RMC
Figure 4 Success rate of detecting replicas in RMC, P-MPC, and LSM.
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et al., and the communication cost increases to the order
of O(n2). When the size of cell s increases to n, then the
number of mapping cells q decreases to 1; that is, q =1,
s = n, then the RMC protocol becomes the GDL proto-
col. The difference between the RMC and the GDL is
that the random verification is used in the RMC scheme
and the deterministic verification is used in the GDL
scheme.
The LSM and P-MPC schemes are also simulated in
this experiment. The parameter settings of the two
schemes are the same as the setting in papers of Parno
[3] and Zhu et al. [15]. Every node has 40 neighbors in
the LSM scheme; the probability that a neighbor of node L
decides to forward L's location claim is 6/d. In the P-MPC
scheme, ps = 0.2, pf =3/d, and v =3, which means that the
probability that every node in the cell decides to store
the location claim packet is 0.2 and the probability that
a neighbor forwards the packet is 3/d.
The probability of detecting node replication attacks
when an adversary makes a single replica (there are twoFigure 5 Communication overhead of RM, RMC, LSM, and P-MPC.nodes with the same ID but in a different location) is
the main measure to analyze the security of a wireless
sensor network. Figure 4 shows the success rates of
detecting replicas using the LSM protocol, the RMC
protocol, and the P-MPC protocol within networks of
different sizes. On average, the success rate of the RMC
is 24.4% higher than that of the LSM. The main reason
for this is that the LSM utilizes a line intersection detection
mechanism, so the detection fails when there is no sensor
node deployed on the point where the lines intersect, while
the RMC utilizes a surface intersection detection mechan-
ism, in which the node on both lines of the horizontal axis
and the vertical axis is taken as the center and works with
its one-hop distance neighbors to constitute the detection
surface, which makes the detection rate 100%. Meanwhile,
the success rate of the RMC is, on average, 5.1% higher
than that of the P-MPC.
In order to evaluate the energy consumption of the
RMC scheme, the communication overheads of the differ-
ent schemes are compared. The communication overhead
is the measure of the average number of packets sent and
Figure 6 The percentage of energy depletion node varies with the number of protocol running rounds.
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shown in Figure 5, when compared with the RM protocol
that uses random verification, the communication overhead
of the RMC protocol is significantly reduced. Compared
with that of the other two protocols, the communication
overhead of RMC is lower at the beginning. When the
capacity of the network is more than 2,000 nodes, then
the communication overhead of the RMC is larger than
that of the LSM and the P-MPC protocols. The gap in the
communication overhead is bigger as the capacity of
network is larger. The main reason for this is that the
RMC protocol applies the random verification mechan-
ism. In order to maintain its high success rate, the number
of mapping cells remains in the order of O
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
m
pð Þ. The lar-
ger network size results in a larger number of mapping
cells, so the communication overhead is larger. On the
other hand, the P-MPC is a variant of the deterministic
verification scheme. Its mapping cells are selected from
deterministic cells and the number of cells is fixed. So, the
number of mapping cells does not increase as the size of
the network increases, thus its communication cost is
relatively stable.
The percentage of the energy-exhausted nodes, which
can be used to evaluate the lifetime of the overall network,
is computed as the proportion of the energy-exhausted
nodes to all of the nodes. Figure 6 shows that the percent-
age of the nodes that are exhausted of energy varies with
the number of the protocol running rounds. As is shown
in Figure 6, the energy consumption of the sensor nodes
in the RMC protocol is apparently lower than that of the
P-MPC and the LSM protocols. After running 300 rounds,
46% of the sensor nodes survive in the LSM protocol, 22%
of the sensor nodes survive in the P-MPC protocol, and
54% of the sensor nodes survive in the RMC protocol.
The reason for this is that the RMC protocol uses the
random verification mechanism. The witness nodes are
selected randomly and the energy consumption is ap-
proximately equal. At the same time, the communication
overhead of the RMC is relative lower.7 Conclusions
In this paper, two distributed detection schemes that are
designed to detect node replication attacks in wireless
sensor networks have been proposed. The preliminary
scheme is the GDL approach. The improved version of
the GDL scheme is the RMC approach. In our approach,
randomly selected cells to which location claims are
mapped and randomly linear-selected node verification
within cells are combined to realize true randomization.
This method is efficiently resilient to a smart attack of
node replication. Our theoretical analysis and the em-
pirical results show that when compared with Parno
et al.'s schemes and Zhu et al.'s schemes, the success
rate of detecting node replication attacks is higher in
our approach. In terms of communication and memory
costs, our scheme is more efficient than that of Parno
et al. The simulation experiment is completed in a uniform
topology environment. In our future work, a non-uniform
topology environment should be used to create a simula-
tion environment that is as close to the real application
environment as possible.
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